Monday 15 June 2015

[Misconduct] Misselling of Structured Notes in Singapore - Part 1 - Background Info

BACKGROUND
This post will provide pertinent details from the Monetary Authority of Singapore's investigation report on the sales and marketing of structured notes linked to Lehman Brothers. The aim of this post is to highlight the importance of complying with regulations and guidelines on product's sale and marketing materials especially during the planning stages which no doubt has a rippling effect.


FALL OF LEHMANN BROTHERS
On 15 September 2008 and 3 October 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (“LBHI”) and Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc. (“LBSF”) respectively filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States of America (the “US”). This resulted in the default or early redemption of a set of credit-linked structured note (the “Notes”).

Key features of the Notes as follows:
i. The Notes were linked to the credit risks of a basket of entities (each termed a “Reference Entity” and collectively termed as “Reference Entities”) on a first-to-default basis. These Reference Entities included financial institutions, multi-national companies and sovereign states;

ii. The portfolio would suffer losses if the credit risk of a portfolio of about 100 to 150 reference entities experienced credit events. If these losses exceeded a certain amount, the Notes would be redeemed early;

iii. In the event the Notes had to be redeemed early, investors would receive a redemption amount which would likely be less, and could be significantly less, than the principal amount.


AFFECTED NOTES  FROM LEHMAN’S BANKRUPTCY

i. Minibond Notes  
Series 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of notes issued by Minibond Limited and arranged by Lehman Brothers Inc (in respect of series 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6) and Lehman Brothers Singapore Pte Ltd (in respect of series 7, 8, 9 and 10) offered from 3 April 2006 to 25 July 2008. Event of defaults occurred under the respective series of the Minibond Notes as the interest payments fell due.

ii. High Notes 5 (HN5)
High Notes 5 (“HN5”) issued and arranged by DBS Bank Ltd (“DBS”) offered from 30 March to 30 April 2007. As a result of LBHI filing for Chapter 11, the notes were redeemed early, DBS has determined the early redemption amount payable to investors of HN5 to be zero.

iii. Series 3 LinkEarner Notes (Jubilee Notes)
Series 3 LinkEarner Notes issued by Jubilee Global Finance Limited and arranged by Merrill Lynch (Singapore) Pte Ltd (the “Jubilee Notes”) offered from 16 April to 18 May 2007. As a result of LBHI filing for Chapter 11, the notes were redeemed early, Merrill Lynch has determined the early redemption amount on the Jubilee Notes to be zero.

iv. Pinnacle Notes
Series 9 and 10 of notes issued by Pinnacle Performance Limited and arranged by Morgan Stanley Asia (Singapore) Pte (the “Pinnacle Notes”) offered from 29 October to 30 November 2007. credit events occurred to five (One of the five was LBHI) of the 100 Synthetic CDO Reference Entities securing the Pinnacle Notes. Morgan Stanley has determined the early redemption amount on the Pinnacle Notes to be zero.


COMPLAINTS & MAS INVESTIGATION
There were news report that investor has lost their money and they were misrepresented. As of 31 May 2009, the Distributors of the Notes had received 6,503 complaints from investors of the Notes.

An investigation was launched by the Monetary Authority of Singapore on FIs’ due diligence on the Notes, the procedures in place at the point of sale, including how the FI ensured that the Notes were sold to clients whose investment objectives and risk tolerance matched the risk profile of the Notes, and the training and supervision of representatives and LFAs in relation to the Notes.

The investigation covered 10 financial institutions (“FIs”) that distributed the Notes. As part of the investigations into two of the Distributors, the Authority also investigated 10 licensed financial advisers (“LFAs”) that were appointed by these two Distributors to refer clients to them.


Financial Institutions (FIs)
FIs recruiting LFAs
Financial Advisers
- ABN AMRO Bank N.V Singapore Branch (ABN)
- DBS Bank Ltd (DBS)
- Malayan Banking Berhad Singapore Branch (MBB)
- Hong Leong Finance Ltd (HLF)
- CIMB-GK Securities Pte Ltd (CIMB)
- DMG & Partners Securities Pte Ltd (DMG)
- Kim Eng Securities Pte Ltd (KESPL)
- OCBC Securities Pte Ltd (OSPL)
-Phillip Securities Pte Ltd (PSPL)
- UOB Kay Hian Pte Ltd (UOBKH)
-OSPL
-PSPL
-Alpha Financial Advisers Pte Ltd
-Cornerstone Planners Pte Ltd
-Elpis Financial Pte Ltd
-Financial Alliance Pte Ltd
-Fin-exis Advisory Pte Ltd
-GYC Financial Advisory Pte Ltd
-IPP Financial Advisers Pte Ltd
-Metropolitan Broking Services Pte Ltd
-Optimus Financial Pte Ltd
-Ray Alliance Financial Advisers Pte Ltd


WHATS NEXT
The sales and marketing practice, financial advice practice,  non-compliances of FIs and distributors will be provided in subsequent posts. After looking at the data and findings by MAS, we will explore  the root causes and corporate cultures that created the lapses in  risks and controls.